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Twelve years ago, in their influential article, James Mahoney and Richard Snyder
(1999) reviewed contemporary research on regime change. They focused on problems
of methodology and methods preference, and on the ‘chicken-egg’ controversy
between the proponents of voluntarism on one side (Di Palma 1990; Przeworski
1991) and structuralism on the other (Luebbert 1991; Rueschmeyer et al. 1992) and
argued that ‘laying the groundwork for the next generation of studies of regime
change requires [...] integration of structural and voluntarist approaches’ (Mahoney
and Snyder 1999, 4).
This chapter seeks to combine structural and actor-oriented approaches in an
analysis of the transition of Czechoslovakia in 1989. Such a combination promises to
get around the rigid conditions of socio-historical macro-structures as well as the
vague, non-explaining flexibility of games in political arenas. It aims to uncover how
structural variables affect the possibilities of politicians and citizens during the
process of democratic transition.
In this chapter, game theory is employed as the actor-related framework for its
analytical rigour and its theoretical potential to achieve a ‘prediction regarding the
outcome of interaction among human beings using only data on the order of events,
combined with a description of the players’ preferences over the feasible outcomes of
the situation’ (Rubinstein 1991, 923). The game theoretical models make use of
Joseph Colomer’s classification of regime change actors (Colomer, 1991), where
actors are defined by their preference orderings. Four groupings in the classification –
Reformists, Openists, Continuists, and Involutionists – constitute the ruling bloc,
while the remaining two – Rupturists and Revolutionaries – represent the opposition
(Figure 9.1).
Figure 9.1. Transition Preference Orders of Strategic Groups (adapted from Colomer
1991, 1285).
Structures and Integrative Approaches
According to Mahoney and Snyder, two distinct integrative analytical methods may
be identified in research on regime change: the path-dependent strategy and the
Funnel of Causality (1999, 11).
Following absolute time in history, the path-dependent strategy looks for critical
junctures in the course toward democracy. This interpretation is based on the
assumption of ‘binding’ history and focuses on ‘temporally intermediate processes
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through which the structural legacies of historical junctures are transmitted and which
ultimately connect past critical junctures to subsequent regime change’ (Mahoney and
Snyder 1999, 13). Thus, even though such a model allows for the introduction of
actors at the critical junctures, this strategy carries the weakness of historical
determination and one-way logic (Larsen 2000, 456-457).
The Funnel of Causality, on the other hand, assumes that ‘structural factors can
never be sufficient causes of human action [...] [and] a margin of actor
maneuverability always exists between the crevices of structural constraints, creating
opportunities for actors to avert regime outcomes strongly favoured by structural
forces’ (Mahoney and Snyder 1999, 13). The funnel is a vector causal model ‘in
which variables from different levels of analysis are treated as independent vectors
with distinct forces and directions’ (Ibid., 12). In other words, the deterministic
causation of the path-dependent approach is replaced by a probabilistic one.
Macro-structural variables are located at the top of the funnel, constituting the most
aggregated level of analysis. In the downward direction, meso- and micro-level
variables follow with shorter durations of specific processes than affected regime
change. Each level of analysis explains a certain amount of variance in non-
democratic regimes leading towards a certain type of transition. Actors at the
leadership level are at the bottom of the funnel where the games of transition take
place. Regime changes are then explained by summing up forces and directions of
variables. This approach allows for combining different types of variables into a
single variable and comparing their relevance. Instead of the problem of bridging
structural levels, an observer is faced with a simple – however tricky – question of
adding explanatory weights of vectors (Mahoney and Snyder 1999, 22). In short,
because of its filtering function, the Funnel of Causality is a valuable tool for
understanding both long- and short-term causes that directly affect the context of
transition.
Together with Oyvind Lervik, who also introduces such a modification in his own
model (Lervik 2001), this chapter discards the common ‘one-way-only’ assumption
and the down-directional causation as sufficient for a valid model of regime change.
Instead of ‘exhaustion’ of variables from higher levels directly to lower levels,
connections are searched for and shown between every level of analysis. It is assumed
that in theory a strong influence from the very bottom of the funnel can affect a
variable at the top, and vice-versa. The case study of Czechoslovakia should support
this assumption with evidence. Changes in the funnel variables are always taken into
account when modelling games of transition and their rules.
A second modification to the funnel strategy makes use of a model proposed by
Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992), where three power structures shape
social and political outcomes. These structures are state, class, and transnational
power. Also this chapter uses these labels, but defines them differently: the variable
‘transnational power’ covers all processes that originate outside the borders of a
country as well as processes common in the whole region. The term ‘state’ refers to
the shape of a political system and its institutions as well as state economy. Lastly, the
‘class’ group represents development variables of civil society, actual social issues
and attitudes towards the regime. The three-dimensional shape of the funnel allows all
classes of variables to interdigitate at one moment at the same place to affect a
particular event. Furthermore, it shows the mutual influence and diffusion of
processes between all structural variables. In the presented model, Stein Larsen’s
types of variables are replaced with the aforementioned transnational power, state,
and class; this classification is based essentially on the difference of duration of the
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observed processes (see Figure 9.2).
Such an approach differs greatly from all previously presented (i.e., Mahoney and
Snyder, Larsen, Lervik), but a similar one was used by e.g., Mahdavi (2006), who
also employed Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens’s model of power structures.
Strictly speaking, this chapter aims to be an innovative synthesis of all these
modifications mentioned above.
Figure 9.2. The 3-D Funnel of Causality.
Czechoslovakia 1989
(T) Transnational Power
Since the Renaissance, East Central Europe was an economic semi-periphery of the
West, more developed than the rest of Eastern Europe or the Baltic states (Pounds
1978). The region differed from Eastern Europe and its nations had always seen
themselves to be a part of the Western civilisation (Berend 1986, 332). As Stein
Rokkan and his followers argue (Rokkan 1975, Kommisrud 1996), all nations in the
region finished their state/nation-building before, or immediately after the First World
War. The interwar period was affected by two global trends: the diffusion of
Marxism-Leninism with a consequent rightist reaction, and the economic depression
of the 1930s. In the 1930s, socio-economic problems contributed to an authoritarian
twist in the majority of East Central European countries. In 1939, Nazi Germany
consumed the whole region – either as an invader or as an ‘ally’.
After the Second World War, the Allies decided upon the fate of East Central
Europe as a border between the West and the East. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary
and East Germany fell under Soviet influence. At the beginning of the Cold War in
the early 1950s, these four countries underwent a period of totalitarianism. Their
regimes were characterised by exalted ideologies and socio-political transitions to
‘democratic centralism’. The Soviet model of economic socialism uniformly rendered
Europe east of the Elbe more homogeneous than ever before. The State’s role became
practically absolute and the application of socialist ideology eliminated the traditional
rural-peasant character of society – there was ‘on average, compared to prewar
conditions, at least a tenfold to fifteen fold increase in industrial production’ (Berend
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1986, 345).
After Stalin’s death in 1953, the reins of ideological control were loosened in the
entire communist bloc, including the Soviet Union itself. Nikita Khrushchev, the new
leader of the USSR, denounced Joseph Stalin’s dictatorship and thus opened a
Pandora’s Box – ‘destroying Stalin’s infallibility destroyed Soviet infallibility as
well’ (Cipkowski 1991, 9). In many countries, including Gomulka’s Poland,
nationalism occurred within the Communist party and the unity of Soviet bloc began
to vanish. Firstly, economic problems brought civil disorders to Poland, East
Germany, and Czechoslovakia. In 1956, structural economic reforms in Hungary
carried a noticeable pattern of political liberalisation. The Soviet army put a violent
end to this development and, after Khrushchev’s fall in 1964, Brezhnev’s rigid era
arrived. Bureaucracy took the place of charismatic leaders, and totalitarian ideology
was on the wane. During the mid-1960s, Brezhnev’s government focused on domestic
problems and lost control of developments in East Central Europe (Ladrech and Wegs
1996, 145), but the 1968 invasion of ‘deviating’ Czechoslovakia indicated the nature
of the renewed Soviet foreign policy towards the region.
According to Ladrech and Wegs, the history of the Soviet bloc from the Brezhnev
era onward may be divided into four phases (Ladrech and Wegs 1996, 235). It began
with meddling in the affairs of East Central European countries in the 1960s and the
1970s, accompanied by a relative growth of living standards. Communist leaders were
trying to divert the attention of the people from their minimal political rights and
demobilise civil society. In the late 1970s, economic depression led to the second
phase, when opposition groups formed in Poland and Hungary. In Poland, the
situation culminated in open protests and the birth of the Solidarity trade union in
1980. This development encouraged dissenters in neighbouring countries, and anti-
regime movements spread across the region. Nevertheless, a successful motion
towards regime change did not start until the third phase in 1985, when Mikhail
Gorbachev took hold of the position of general secretary of the Soviet Communist
party. As a response to the critical Soviet economic performance, Gorbachev
introduced perestroika and glasnost and gave his permission for liberalisation in the
bloc. Moreover, in 1989, Gorbachev proclaimed a policy of nonintervention
(Cipkowski 1991, 10).
The aforementioned characteristics of East Central Europe are all hallmarks of post-
totalitarian countries – a limited degree of pluralism inside the regime, weakened
commitment to ideology, only minimal routine mobilisation and technocratic
leadership (Linz and Stepan 1996, 42-51). The regimes varied from ‘early’ to ‘frozen’
post-totalitarianism. The various and differently intense processes, which led to these
conditions of post-totalitarianism, may be summed up as follows:
Long-term
(1) The region had always been considered a semi-periphery to the West.
(2) State/nation building process had been completed before the Communists took
power.
(3) All countries experienced a democratic as well as an authoritarian period in their
history.
Middle-term
(4) East Central Europe was of a vital military importance to the Soviet bloc.
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(5) Economies in the region copied to a major extent the Soviet socialist model.
(6) In the 1950s, relations within the Soviet bloc worsened and became more
complicated.
Short-term
(7) All countries had been undergoing a period of constant economic decline since the
1960s.
(8) Soviet liberalisation and the policy of nonintervention were introduced in the late
1980s.
(9) Civil society showed a strong inclination to a ‘snowball’ effect in liberalisation.
(S) State
From 1918 to 1938, Czechoslovakia represented an exemplary stable democracy
amidst authoritarian neighbours. The Czechoslovak Republic was founded upon four
principles that set the stage for later fundamental intra-nation clashes: republicanism,
social radicalism, anti-Catholicism, and an all-embracing constitutional Czechoslovak
nationhood. (Balík et al. 2003, 45). During the era of the First Republic, the
heterogeneity of national and ideological interests demanded a consensual type of
polity that lasted until 1938. In the next seven years, the country was occupied by the
Nazis and from 1945 to 1948, Czechoslovakia experienced a semi-democratic period
when the Communists were preparing for their takeover. The Communists were
strengthened by Soviet support and the close relationship between Czechoslovakia
and the Soviet Union that dated back to 1943. In 1946, the first free elections were
held and showed an unprecedented 40 per cent majority for the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia (KSČ). The main cause behind the Communists’ success was surely
their plan for agricultural and economic reform in which the land that had formerly
belonged to 2.5 million ejected Germans was redistributed to former voters of the
Agrarians, who were proscribed in 1945 for their alleged collaboration with the Nazi
regime.
The forced Czechoslovak withdrawal from the Marshall Plan signalled critical
pressure from the Soviets to resolve the situation in the country and on 25 February,
1948, the Communist coup ended the long-lasting domestic political crisis. From
1948 till 1953, Czechoslovakia did not differ from the common totalitarian model of
the Soviet bloc. All competitive power-centers like the Church or liberal-minded
officer corps were violently crushed. The four satellite parties of the KSČ were utterly
powerless.
Signs of liberalisation could be seen in Czechoslovakia during Khrushchev’s era.
The state of the country in the late 1950s could be regarded as a consultative post-
totalitarianism (Balík et al. 2003, 136). Having no strong leader, the Party was
controlled by groups of bureaucrats, and apparatus sections. Political processes and
procedures became stable and rigid. State socialism – with the KSČ as a cornerstone
of the regime – was de jure confirmed in the new constitution of 1960. The
governmental system solidified in Bohemia and Moravia and was introduced into the
comparatively undeveloped Slovakia, where a type of national communism had been
evolving. However, the Slovak autonomous government was at that time even more
limited and its authority circumscribed.
The situation changed only in the mid-1960s, with the 1968 Constitutional Act and
federalisation of the country. In 1968, the degree of liberalisation in Czechoslovakia
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reached the level of quasi-pluralistic post-totalitarianism and continued to become
even more democratic (Balík et al. 2003, 136-137). Efforts to boost the deteriorating
national economy showed flaws in the Marxist ideology. Civic organisations and non-
political groups were becoming organised and weakened the fundamentals of the
Communist ideology.
The process of democratisation was interrupted by the invasion of the Warsaw Pact
armies on 21 August 1968. Occupation forces remained in the country until the
regime broke down and the Czechoslovak army was under full Soviet control.
Normalisation, i.e. the process of reverting to the pre-1968 political situation, began
with purges in the KSČ, focusing first on the leadership and then on low-level party
members (Fiala 1999). Charges of the members were based on the materials of the
State Security (StB), a secret police corps and a fundamental constituent of the lasting
non-democratic regime. The presence of the corps was perhaps even more valuable
than that of armed forces (Friedrich and Brziezinski 1965).From 1968 until 1989, the
number of collaborators with the State Security ranged from 11,000 to 13,000 (Milan
2000, 27, 35). The Communist Party renewed its power and became the only power-
centre in the country, while the relevance of the elected legislative and executive
organs declined. With the 15th Congress of the KSČ in April 1976, the personal and
ideological transformation of the regime was completed and any prospective progress
had been frozen.
The economic trend of the 1970s pursued the political policy of normalisation. The
relative living comfort in Czechoslovakia, one of the most developed countries in the
Soviet bloc, preserved the social peace and prevented conditions favourable for a
revolution as characterised by the modernisation paradigm (Lipset 1960, 4). ‘The less
democracy there was in politics, the more of it was in economy’ (Turek 1995, 68). On
the other hand, for twenty years preceding the regime breakdown, the social contract,
based on a certain level of living comfort for everyone, did not allow the national
economy to grow and brought a significant lack of working motivation. The poor
performance of economy disunited the ruling bloc and a minor group of pro-
Gorbachev bureaucrats called for a slight regime change that would enable economic
growth. At the dawn of the regime change, ‘state’ variables may be summarised as
follows:
Long-term
(1) The role of the Church was considerably weak, especially in the Czech lands.
(2) The Czechoslovak polity was consensual, not competitive.
(3) The state/nation-building process was completed, more in the Czech lands than in
Slovakia.
Middle-term
(4) The power centre lay not in the elective governmental body, but in the Communist
Party.
(5) The gap between business and political elites’ interests was widening.
(6) Armed forces of the Warsaw Pact remained in the country after the 1968 invasion.
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Short-term
(7) The Communist Party’s ideological and personal base had frozen and could not
progress.
(8) The StB infiltrated most of the regime opposition.
(9) The regime leaders split up into pro-perestroika pragmatists and orthodox
Communists.
(C) Class
Czechoslovakia was a country of a monocephalic territorial structure, with Prague in
the position of an all-dominating centre (Rokkan et al. 1987, 26; Hloušek and
Kopeček 2004, 13). The First Czechoslovak Republic was still predominantly an
agrarian country and full-scale industrialisation did not come until the post-war era.
The start of communisation was the actual birth of the urban working class in
Czechoslovakia, when the newcomers swamped the relatively small, pre-war group of
workers (Schöpflin 1993, 31-6). Thus, the Communists in the late 1940s completely
changed the social structure of Czechoslovakia and gained enough support for the
first decades of their rule. The 1945 displacement of the German and Magyar
minority homogenised the nation.
After the totalitarian period (1948-1953), the ideological grip on society in
Czechoslovakia loosened. The intelligentsia ventured to discuss existing taboos that
led to the cultural liberalisation of the 1960s and a partial restoration of relations with
civic and cultural circles in the West. People were once again directly interested in
politics, and various features of pluralism emerged.
Consequently, 21 August 1968 affected mainly the intelligentsia and civil society.
The process of ‘normalisation’ succeeded in its purpose – to restore Communist rule
and to placate the populace. From the early 1970s, society found itself in a state of
resignation from politics. For average Czechoslovak citizens, accepting the regime
and publicly showing their loyalty meant making a sacrifice that would lead to a
peaceful life. Citizens had to ignore their values and adopt others – twisted, but
nevertheless, mutual. Because of a lack of options, they followed the rules of the
existing social contract (Možný 1999, 35, 49). The official media were full of vacuous
phrases, which formed the façade of the regime, but in which no one believed
(Fidelius 1998; Civín 2005).
The post-invasion leaders conducted purges against the reformers differently in the
two federated republics. Compared to the Slovak elites, the Party leadership
persecuted the Czechs harshly. ‘The result was that the Czech intelligentsia was
pushed into dissent, while the Slovaks compromised and collaborated with the
regime’ (Eyal 2003, xx). Because of that, the opposition against the ‘normalised’
regime arose – with the exception of the early 1970s attempts of former Communist
reformers – first and mainly in the Czech lands. Intellectuals, academics, and artists,
all ‘the groups most handicapped by the normalisation [...] became the core of the
opposition’ (Otáhal 1994, 21). Charter 77 emerged as the major platform that
popularised ideas of the dissent in the society. The group’s proclaimed purpose was to
‘advocate human and civil rights in the country and the world’ (Declaration of Charter
77 1977). Such a declaration pointed to the very core of the post-totalitarian regime
and easily became a rallying point for the anti-regime opposition.
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At the end of the 1980s, the social climate of resignation began to change as a new
generation, not branded by the actual experience of the ’68 Prague Spring and the
post-Spring purges, came of age. According to Možný, Czechoslovak ‘real’ or
‘pragmatic’ socialism was based on a mutual arrangement of reciprocal services,
which in reality substituted capitalism. Economic strength and networks were
replaced by status in the ‘nomenclature’ (Možný 1999, 74-78). However, the new
generation found this system highly unsatisfying and that manifested itself in the rise
of students’ movements and various independent post-material initiatives (Vaněk and
Otáhal 1999, 17). University students were active mainly in the new subcultures of
New Wave and Punk. In 1987 and 1988, first attempts to establish a parallel, non-
state organisation to the pro-regime Czechoslovak Socialist Union of Youth (SSM)
were answered by an immediate repressive counteraction by the StB. ‘Students were
not afraid to criticise’, stated the Prague body of the KSČ in 1988 (Otáhal 2003, 63).
As the majority of the opposition movement could be found in Bohemia and
Moravia, the situation in Slovakia was incomparably less favourable to a regime
change. A major difference between the Czech and Slovak opposition was the
significant presence of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. The Church was effectively
paralysed during the normalisation and cannot be considered as an opposition centre
until the late 1980s. Still, there existed an underground network of anti-regime
activities, disguised by the official image of a state-subjugated Church (Cuhra 2005,
70). The early 1980s saw the revival of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia. After
the protest of Czechoslovak Cardinal František Tomášek and the Pope’s official
dissolution of the pro-regime Syndicate of the Catholic Clergy (Pacem in Terris) in
1982, the Czechoslovak authorities were forced to reduce their control over the
Church.
Movements in civil society were the sparks that started the 1989 regime change.
However, the process of forming the regime opposition was extremely complicated
for several reasons:
Long-term
(1) Prague had always been in the position of an all-dominating centre.
(2) There were no significant ethnic minorities in Czechoslovakia after 1946.
(3) The birth of the Czechoslovak working class was linked to the Communist era.
Middle-term
(4) The reformers of the 1960s lost their influential positions after 1968.
(5) Czech elites were persecuted by the regime more severely than Slovak elites.
(6) Civil society underwent a process of political demobilisation in the 1970s.
Short-term
(7) The generation not branded by August 1968 came of age.
(8) The opposition movement found a common ground in the human rights
movement.
(9) The Catholic Church was stimulated by the Vatican in the early 1980s.
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Game 1: Unsuccessful Liberalisation
At this point, the first game-theoretical model, showing a struggle for liberalisation
inside the ruling bloc may be formulated. Most of the previous works on the
Czechoslovak transition neglect this phase and conclude simply that the ‘frozen’ type
of post-totalitarianism does not allow liberalisation to occur. This study argues that in
Czechoslovakia, there was a possibility of broad liberalisation, but it emerged too
early to succeed.
No later than 1986, four model factions had surfaced amongst the Communist
leadership, induced by the worsening economic situation of Czechoslovakia, changes
in the USSR, and in the region (i.e. variables T(6,7), S(4,7,9), and C(4)). These
factions were:
 Reformists, i.e. those young politicians who did not partake in the
normalisation purges and were not bound by the anti-reformist pragmatic
acceptance.
 Openists, a strong group led by Lubomír Štrougal, the long-time Federal
Prime Minister (1970-1988), and the official head of government responsible
for national economic performance, who openly demanded regime reforms.
 Continuists, i.e. moderates represented by Ladislav Adamec, a pragmatic
careerist of the normalisation era.
 Involutionists, led by Vasil Bil’ak, representatives of the ideological orthodox
hard-line (Saxonberg 2001, 199-200).
An open conflict of the factions took place at the KSC Politburo meeting on 18
November 1987, where a successor to Gustáv Husák, who had held the position of the
Party’s general secretary for two decades, was to be selected. Štrougal was the
candidate of the pro-reform bloc; Milouš Jakeš, a puppet of the Bil’ak faction, was the
frontman of the hard-liners. As it turned out, Štrougal’s position was weaker than it
might have been assumed from the quantity of pro-reformists. Because most of the
reformists held the position of mere candidate members in the Politburo with no
voting rights and the moderate wing eventually agreed upon Jakeš, Štrougal lost and
was demoted in the regime leadership hierarchy (Wolchik 1991, 126-131).
Why did Adamec ally himself with Jakeš instead of Štrougal? And was there a
chance that – under different circumstances – he would have supported the Openists?
This study offers the following explanation (Figure 9.3):
Figure 9. 3. Game 1 ‘Unsuccessful Liberalisation’.
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When Adamec proposed Jakeš as the future general secretary, he followed the
dominant strategy of the ‘Continuists’ actor. Taking side with Vasil Bil’ak‘s group of
Involutionists, it appears that Adamec was aiming for the Pareto optimal1 equilibrium
of the game. When he stayed loyal to the bloc of hard-liners, he voted out the
Openists group from the game for good and thus secured his own position in the
ruling bloc and an opportunity for further promotions. If he had chosen differently, he
would have had to support regime reforms and, when carrying them out, to confront
the Openists. In this conflict, he would have lost to the opposing actor and reached his
least desirable outcome.
As to the latter question of an alternative outcome, the ‘Nature’ tool, which is based
on Bayes’s Theorem, is introduced into the model. The right-hand sub-game
illustrates a state of the world in which the Communist regime is able to survive the
growing crisis. Conversely, the left-hand sub-game depicts a state of an inevitable
regime breakdown. If the former is the case, the right choice for the Continuists is to
ally with the Involutionists. However, if the regime is about to collapse, there exists a
chance that those who helped the regime transition would benefit from the outcome.
For the Continuists, their support to reforms thus becomes the more profitable, the
more likely the regime breakdown is to occur. What must be stressed is one particular
fact: according to the rational equilibria of the game, the least desired outcome for the
Continuists when they chose to support reforms has to equal or surpass the best
outcome when they chose not to.
In the 1980s, there were only few indicators that Czechoslovakia was actually
reaching its turning point toward a non-Communist regime (Wheaton and Kavan
1992, 25). No open expressions of mass regime-opposition took place before 1988
and even Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit ended up far more in favour of the Involutionists
(variable T(4)) (Smith 1992, 326). Opinions about the degree of economic crisis
distinctly differed (Saxonberg 2001, 77). The probability of q therefore seemed to be
lower than it was in reality.
Still, as the process of liberalisation pushed ahead in the rest of the Soviet bloc and
opposition to the regime emerged, the leaders’ beliefs in the probability of having a
collapsing regime were changing. The Continuists in the Federal government,
represented by Ladislav Adamec, the new Prime Minister, were trying to free
themselves of the Party’s control and continue in an independent ‘restructuring’
policy. According to Miroslav Štěpán, a newly installed member of the Politburo, the
regime allowed in December 1988 a demonstration celebrating the UN Human
Rights’ Day, because it ‘wanted to see how the opposition would react to an opening’
(Saxonberg 2001, 318). However, the Party’s reversion to a hard-line strategy during
Palach’s week in January shows that the leaders were afraid of a quick backfire and
losing control of the process. If it had not been for the earlier neutralisation of the
Openists, the opening would have quite probably continued.
In conclusion, the unsuccessful attempt of the Štrougal camp to take control over the
Party’s policy weakened the soft-liners’ position within the regime and created an
even more conservative regime than the one before 1987. If Adamec’s beliefs were to
be rationally consistent, his dominating strategy was to support Jakeš; that strategy
became crucial for his later promotion to the post of the Federal Prime Minister and
the end of liberalisation. The information he possessed in 1987 spoke strongly for an
alliance with the Involutionists – however incorrect this information would prove in
1 An outcome of a game is Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome that makes every player
at least as well off and at least one player strictly better off.
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the following months.
Game 2: Successful Democratisation
Game 1 explains how an early attempt to liberalise the regime failed and how the
ruling-bloc agreed on a hard-line anti-reform policy. However, this section shows that
gaps occurred in that policy. These were wide enough for the opposition to organise
itself and to demand democratisation. In August 1988, the first mass public protest
against the regime, with more than 10,000 participants, mainly young people, took
place in Prague (compare variables C(1,7)). More rallies followed in October and in
December, with the appearance of various opposition groups and dissidents in the
presence of officers of the StB (variables S(8), C(8)). ‘The issue of human rights
provided the basis for disparate political groups to come together on a common
platform’ (Wheaton and Kavan 1992, 27). Despite violent repressions, mass meetings
were occurring during the whole year 1989, bolstered by the revived Catholic Church
(variable C(9)) in Slovakia and Moravia (variable S(1)) and supportive activities of
artists and intellectuals in Prague, who are usually ‘the first to manifest public
opposition to authoritarian rule, often before the transition has been launched’
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 49). In the summer, the opposition’s activity was
given a further boost by events in neighbouring countries (variable T(9)).
A specific kind of liberalisation preceded this development, in the area, where the
pressure for democratisation became most intense – in the students’ movements. The
SSM leader Vasil Mohorita, appreciative of the crisis in the pro-regime youth
organisation, called for liberalisation of the regime at least from the spring of 1989.
His position and rights as a member of the Politburo enabled him to organise the
student movement and sponsor some independent initiatives. This gap in the regime’s
control was a direct cause of the authorised protest march on 17 November 1989, and
the subsequent police violence, sparking the ‘Velvet Revolution’.
The widely known course of this event resulted in the decision of the independent
student movement to go on strike. Students were aware of the need to find a support
for their demands, should the strike succeed. Even if they could persuade their fellow-
students, non-members of the independent organisations (which they were) and draw
academics, intellectuals and artists into the strike (which they also did), would they
succeed in attracting the apathetic civil society (variable C(6)) – especially the
cornerstone of the Communist power, the workers (variable C(3))? In the end, they
succeeded because of the simplest reason: even for the working class, in the autumn
of 1989, ‘the cost of toleration [of the regime] was greater than the cost of
intervention’ (Dahl 1971, 15) (variable S(5)). According to Jon Hovi and B. E. Rasch
(Hovi and Rasch 1993, 91), the situation was sufficiently desperate for a participant in
the strike to presume that any outcome of this action can be better than the initial
state. The relation between an individual’s assumption about the number of
participants and probability of success, upon which he or she decides whether to
participate, can be found in Oyvind Lervik’s model (Lervik 2001) (Figure 9.4).
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Figure 9.4. Mass Movement (adapted from Lervik 2001).
The Party leadership was stunned and incapable of action when mass protests sprang
up on Monday 20 November – police actions against the strikers in the first week
after 17 November appeared chaotic and weak. The Party’s Politburo did not meet
until Monday, resolved nothing and called an extra Central Committee meeting for
Friday. On Tuesday, the Politburo decided to call in the People’s Militia, yet without
giving any orders to act. A military solution was contemplated during the whole
week, but ultimately rejected – no ethnic cleavages existed in the nation (variables
T(2), C(2)) (as did in, e.g. China, where such a solution was still plausible) and
nobody believed that ‘if ordered to fight their own people [...] soldiers would obey
their officers’ orders’ (Bradley 1992, 93). An intervention of the Soviet troops in the
country was merely an unlikely threat to the opposition (variables T(8), S(6)). The
indecisiveness shown at the Friday Central Committee meeting convinced the Prime
Minister Adamec that whatever he would do, he must do without other Party leaders
(Suk 2003, 44).
Meanwhile, the Civic Forum (OF), an umbrella civic organisation, became the major
actor of the opposition and successively absorbed all other anti-regime groups,
including the Student Strike Committee. The key role in this Rupture-preferring
organisation was played by Czech dissidents and the Chartists in particular, under the
unquestionable dominance of Václav Havel. Two members of the OF, musicians
Michael Kocáb and Michal Horáček, had been in touch with the Adamec camp since
September 1989 and through them the Prime Minister now began negotiations with
the opposition. From the first meeting on 26 November, until the presentation of the
new government, the OF supported Adamec against the radical opposition camp and
maintained its policy to present him as ‘the only representative of the ruling bloc’
(Suk 2003, 46). Why did they do so (Figure 9.5)?
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Figure 9.5. Game 2 ‘Successful Democratisation’.
In Game 2, four possible states of the world are introduced, among which the OF
(Rupturists) could choose the one most likely to succeed. From their behaviour, it is
quite clear that they did not consider States 1 and 4 to be the reality – the equilibria of
those games lead already in the Rupturists’ first move to an alliance with the
Revolutionaries who advocate a non-negotiable solution. If the Rupturists had
believed in one of these states of the world and had still resolved for negotiations,
they would have made a move off the equilibrium path. In the case of an iterated
game, it could be regarded as rational anyway. However, in the circumstances of
November 1989, it seems implausible that the OF believed in iterations of the game.
Most probably, the Rupturists were thinking only in the limits of States 2 and 3. If
the latter was their belief, they would also hardly start to negotiate and probably settle
for a common policy with the Revolutionaries. Backward induction shows the
strategy as the Nash,2 non-Pareto optimal equilibrium that would have probably led to
a more violent confrontation or quick takeover. In fact, this game is the infamous
Prisoner’s Dilemma.3 Negotiations would be profitable for the Rupturists only if there
was an Openists’ government.
However, in the previous game of liberalisation, the Adamec group was portrayed as
the Continuists, and their ex-ante and ex-post behaviour indicates no change of their
preferential set. Why then did the OF decide to negotiate with Adamec? A plausible
explanation is that Havel and his fellow-workers believed in another state of the world
than actually existed. From the OF’s actions during this period of transition, it may be
assumed that the OF did not uncover Adamec’s real preferences before 3 December,
1989. Thus, in line with the rationality of the Continuists actor, the ‘15 Communists +
5 non-Communists’ fiasco government was the actual outcome of the game.
2 Actors are in Nash equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them would lead that
player to earn less than if he or she remained with his or her current strategy.
3 In the classic form of Prisoner’s Dilemma, cooperating is strictly dominated by defecting
from cooperation, so that the only possible equilibrium for the game is for all players to
defect.
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Game 3: Čalfa’s Dilemma
The new Communist government presented on 3 December, fell short of the
expectations of Czechoslovak society. Consequently, the OF changed their strategy
and increased their demands, particularly in the pressing issue of the composition of
economic ministries (variable T(5)). The ‘new’ government resigned as early as 4
December and negotiations with Adamec were re-opened. Outcomes for both actors
were equal, but not Pareto optimal. Adamec, who no longer relied on his alliance with
the Party and saw no opportunity in forming a new Continuists’ government, switched
the weight of game arenas (Tsebelis 1990, 7) and as his ‘principal’ arena chose, most
surprisingly for the Rupturists, the presidential contest (Suk 2003, 119).
At that moment, the OF was caught off guard. So far, the talks focused mainly on the
Federal and national governments. The Presidency was a delicate issue – the person
who filled the post, would represent the direction of transition: either towards a new
Prague Spring, or to a complete regime change and re-integration with the West
(variable T(1)). To take up a particular historical legacy was crucial, for the Velvet
Revolution ‘was characterised by almost complete lack of progressive, prospective
ideas’ (Habermas 1990, 162). On 7 December, Adamec resigned from his post of
Prime Minister and from then on, featured solely as the new head of the KSČ. The OF
was facing a tricky dilemma: for a transition by agreement, ‘the weakness or absence
of maximalist actors [is necessary] [...] because their participation causes
disequilibrium and political instability’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 19) – the
Communist Party’s activity thus was a menace to democracy. Suspicions about
conspiracy arose in the opposition (Suk 2003, 210-211) and the contest for the
presidency affected the unity of the anti-regime movement. The gap between the
Czechs and Slovaks widened, mainly on the issue of historical continuity (variables
T(3), S(3), and C(5)), and the discord culminated in an internal conflict about the OF’s
presidential candidate: would it be Václav Havel, or one of the ‘68 reformers,
Alexander Dubček?
Most surprisingly, a new man in the post of Federal Prime Minister contributed
decisively to Havel’s final victory. Adamec’s protégé and successor, Prime Minister
Marián Čalfa was a Slovak and, according to custom, the Presidency and the federal
head of government were to be split between both federated nations. Subsequently,
Čalfa was regarded by the OF as a suitable Prime Minister for the whole transitional
period.
How could a man from the Adamec camp become the Prime Minister of the
transitional government? Čalfa officially governed the country from 10 December, the
very day of Gustáv Husák’s resignation from the Presidency, thereby chairing the
State Security Council, commanding the armed forces, and co-administrating the
Ministry of Interior. Moreover, he was now competent to grant pardon to Havel, who
was de jure still on probation, and remove the last official barrier for Havel’s
presidential nomination. Furthermore, during a secret meeting, Čalfa offered Havel a
very tempting prospect: he believed that he could persuade the MPs of the Federal
Assembly to co-opt new members from the opposition and elect Havel as President.
The Assembly was still under Communist control and, thanks to the complex
constitutional framework (variable S(2)), the OF needed almost 90 per cent of seats in
the Assembly to pass important acts and secure Havel’s victory. And now, Čalfa
promised that it would happen before Christmas (Suk 2003, 226). Game 3 explains
how it could be done (Figure 9.6):
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Figure 9.6. Sub-game ‘The Continuists’ Switch’.
Čalfa was apparently a pragmatist, who understood the probable consequences of
students’ demands in November remarkably quickly. He was a member of the
Adamec camp, but diverged from its ‘Continuists’ attitude. When Adamec selected
Čalfa as his successor, he may not have been aware of the fact that he had chosen a
Reformist, who would eventually abandon him. Čalfa deliberately substituted the
Continuists strategy with a contingent one that he agreed on with Havel during their
meeting on 15 December 1989, and settled for the second best outcome. In a
Reformist’s beliefs, this move would lead to a better outcome in the next game. He
may have been thinking along the following lines (Figure 9.7):
Figure 9.7. Game 3 ‘Čalfa’s Dilemma’.
Čalfa most likely appreciated the fact that whatever path he would take, he would
always reach the least desired outcome and the opposing actor would always gain the
best of it. Therefore, he may have been meditating on the probability of two states of
the world: a future democratic ‘Rupturist’ government, or the socialist ‘Continuist’
government. If the democratic opposition should win, it was rational to ally with the
Rupturists and vice versa. The probability of q seemed in mid-December already so
low that he decided to ally himself with the Rupturists. In addition, in an iterated
game, Čalfa could have changed his strategy and reached his better outcome within a
Pareto optimal strongly stable equilibrium, when the other actor has no intention to
change his or her strategy. In an iterated game with the Continuists, he would have
only caused a cycle-game with potentially infinite iterations (Figure 9.9). His
information was complete enough to make the move he did.
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Figure 9.8. Strongly Stable4 Equilibrium & Force-vulnerable Equilibrium.5
On 28 December, the MPs elected one of their new co-opted members, Alexander
Dubček, to the office of Chairman of the Federal Assembly and on the next day,
Václav Havel to the office of Czechoslovak President. During the following weeks,
discords between the OF and the Public against Violence (VPN, the Slovak parallel
opposition organisation) were gaining momentum. More and more groups inside the
opposition movement separated from the umbrella-like OF and original political
parties from the National Front started their own policies. The time between Havel’s
victory and the June parliamentary elections was filled with issues of a systemic
change: economic reforms, the dissolution of the State Security, the Czecho-Slovak
nationality problem, etc. The field of research would be too intricate for a simple
game-theoretical model. It is plausible, however, to say that the danger of regress into
a Communist regime was warded off before Christmas 1989 and also to perceive the
December co-optation as the end of transition and the outset of consolidation.. Three
existing games of transition should therefore suit the purpose of this study.
Conclusion
Three simple game-theoretical formulae are presented here and applied to the
Czechoslovak regime change in 1989. Structural variables describe the settings of
games in a new 3-D model of the Funnel of Causality. Its modifications are designed
to show how variables of different origin and duration can affect a single historical
event and to overcome the common one-directional dependency of structural
approaches.
The case study begins with a structural description of all the crucial processes that
led to the ‘Velvet Revolution’. Three games of transition are formulated, explaining
the course of regime change that started with an attempt to liberalise the post-
totalitarian regime in November 1987 and ended with the presidential election in
December 1989. Three findings in particular should be noted:
Firstly, during the Czechoslovak transition, four groups of actors were successively
neutralised (Figure 9.9) and dropped out of the game.
4 i.e. Nash equilibrium.
5 A force-vulnerable equilibrium is where a player can induce a change of strategy by actually
changing his or her own strategy away from the equilibrium.
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Figure 9.9: Game Overview.
Secondly, wrong beliefs of the ‘Rupturists’ actor helped to start negotiations with the
ruling bloc. In the case of complete information, the regime change would have been
much more revolutionary and difficult.
Finally, by neutralising the ‘Openists’ in 1978, the ‘Continuists’ actor most likely
helped its own neutralisation in 1989 and contributed to the final outcome of the
games – not a mere reform, but a complete regime change.
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